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Introduction 0.1
[This introduction is a response to the invitation to supply, along with
the publications on which my application is based "an additional,
expanded, discussion, not exceeding 5000 words (in English) of the
contribution of the submitted works to the general advancement of
knowledge of the field/fields of study".']
I
The question of development has been one of the major concerns of
modern social science. It followed from an interest in progress,
especially moral and scientific progress, which can be traced back to the
Renaissance or before and which received a great boost from the
Enlightenment. Adam Smith introduced a new concern with economic
(especially commercial and industrial) progress; and Hegel and later
Marx and many others developed his ideas into stage theories of human
history in which the economic was entwined with the social and
political. At the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th centuries
many scholars looked back on a century of unprecedented economic
change following an industrial revolution to which the label
"development" began to be attached. Since then social theorists and
economists have since made increasingly frequent attempts to define it
and account for it.
From the First World War until after the end of the Second, European
thinking, at least, was temporarily more concerned with crisis and
stability than with growth and development. In parts of the Third World,
however, especially in Latin America, some home-spun ideas about
development and how to promote it began to emerge. With Asian and
African decolonization and the growth of international organizations, the
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idea of development was finally universalized. According to the
predominant view of the question, countries were seen as either already
developed or "developing", implying that some day all countries would
be developed. A critical view saw "developing" as no more than a
cynical euphemism to cover up the fact that the poor countries were
really being "underdeveloped", a condition which had a tendency to
persist rather than to be eliminated. Unity, however, existed around the
axiomatic notion that people would be better off if the countries they
lived in were developed. The idea of development, however, has
gradually become a more problematic one and the unity in its favour
shows signs of breaking down.
Different ideas about development were necessarily accompanied by
attempts to measure the level of development which a country had
achieved and to see whether it was advancing towards the goal or not,
and at what speed. So the epoch of development has also been one of
growing interest in international statistical comparisons.
II
The essays and chapters submitted here are concerned with the relation
between ideas about development and ways of measuring it. They do not
have the monographic consistency of a Ph.D. thesis since they were
written over a period of 30 years. But I believe that they represent a set
of pertinent and relatively consistent interventions in important debates,
most of which are continuing. The questions with which they are
concerned are relatively constant; the answers less so. This partly
reflects reconsideration on the part of the author, and partly the
exploration of new paths which have been opened up in the course of the
debate during the period covered by the submitted pieces.
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The methodology used is a consistent one. Most of the pieces are
primarily theoretical and lie withing the broad field of political
economy. Empirical material is frequently used to back up or form the
background to primarily theoretical arguments. The author has not
collected primary data but used existing data from a wide range of
sources. Such originality as the method possesses comes from the way in
which the data are processed, analyzed and presented. In contemporary
economics this method is a threatened species, though it is still not
extinct. It survives better in economic history than economics and it
should be clear from these pieces that some of my principal influences
have been economic historians. I am strongly of the view that this kind
of interplay between theory and critically assessed empirical material,
without much use of econometric methodology, remains a powerful and
important method.
Most of these chapters are interventions in debates in which the
opposing arguments have usually been very polarized. Such polarization
has virtues and drawbacks. Few arguments find their rightful place
unless at some time they are advocated with some extremism. And some
examples of extremism will be found here. But more often I have
opposed the excessive polarization of arguments, and accepted parts of
apparently very different positions. This partly arises from the fact that
many of these essays had as much a divulgative purpose as an analytical
or polemical one. Those essays which are most partisan still attempt to
produce a more rigorous (which often means less extreme) version of the
arguments which they support. The general result of this is not, I hope,
theoretical moderation but rather what I would like to call positive
theoretical eclecticism. Eclecticism, however, has been for me a slowly
acquired taste.
A particular aspect of this eclecticism has been an attempt to bridge
0.4 Introduction
some of the gap between marxist and non-marxist discussions of these
questions. Marxism remains an important influence for me but I am
always distressed by the anti-empirical nature of much marxist writing.
And I am increasingly convinced that the marxist approach is more
potent in its less dogmatic than its more dogmatic forms.
Bill Warren did us all a favour in focussing attention on the marxism of
Marx. I think he erred, however, in making Marx much more single-
minded than he really was. Recent reading of parts of Marx's writings
hitherto unknown to me, has led me to the conclusion that Marx did not
have only one view on the relationship between world capitalism and the
underdeveloped countries. He had at least three: that which stresses the
positive side of capitalist expansion, which Bill Warren singled out and
which is illustrated largely by examples from India': another which
resembles much more dependency theory which is largely illustrated
with examples from Ireland': and a third which has something in
common with the recent alternative, even anti-development thinking,
which refers in practice mainly to Russia', Whether these fragments are
part of a unified structure or whether they represent Marx changing his
mind is an interesting and open question.
J See Bill Warren, Imperialism, Pioneer of Capitalism, London: New Left Books, 1980 and
V.a.Kiernan, 'Marx and India' in Marxism and Imperialism,
2 Jie-Hyun Lim, 'Marx's theory of imperialism and the national question', Science and Society,
Vol 56, No 2, Summer 1992
3 See Teodor Shanin (ed), Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the 'peripheries of
capitalism', London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983
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III
Chapters 1 - 4 hinge on the issue of industrialization. Chapter 1
attempted to introduce some debates in economic history into a famous
polemic in development economics. Chapter 2 contributed a systematic
comparison of the voluminous writings on patterns of industrial
development, a novel way of comparing levels of industrialization which
was later used by others in further research and an exhaustive discussion
of arguments for and against industrialization. The final chapter of the
book also tries to integrate hypotheses about economic history
(especially those of Alexander Gerschenkron) with the then developing
theory of dependency. This theme is further developed in Chapter 3,
especially in relation to classic marxist writings.
All these chapters share a number of assumptions common in
development studies at the time they were written (see 10.5-10.6). These
are that the nature of development is broadly speaking equivalent to
what happened in developed countries to bring them to their present
state and that, therefore, the history of Europe, Japan, the USA and the
USSR (at that time commonly regarded as a developed country) is of
great relevance to the quest for development today. They also for the
most part make the assumption that development is close to being
synonymous with industrialization, although Chapter 2 makes some
important reservations about that (2.64-2.106).
Both the final part of Chapter 2 (2.107-2.134) and Chapter 3 paid special
attention the question of the historical and international context of the
development process in developing countries. Both of them argue,
though with less extremism than was often the case in the general
dependency camp with which I identified, that by and large the
international economic environment is an obstacle to further examples of
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national development, at least of a capitalist kind, and that some form of
isolation or protection from that environment is necessary to
development. Chapter 3 (3.4-3.7) tries to spell out in detail the necessary
conditions for a successful independent industrialization, the possibility
of which was part of the debate.
These general ideas have subsequently come under attack, especially
from three quarters: from a number of Marxists, starting with the writing
of Bill Warren; from the neo-liberalism which has come to dominate
orthodox development economics; and, more recently, from a more
amorphous collection of critics of development associated with the so-
called new social movements and alternative currents within the social
sciences. In the period since writing Chapters 1 - 3 these three currents
of thinking (especially the first and the last) have obliged me in different
ways to rethink what I then argued, to change it considerably, yet not to
abandon it entirely. Chapters 4 - 10 reflect this process of rethinking.
Chapter 5 is the most extensive statement of my reasons for coming to
think that some of my earlier conclusions and assumptions needed to to
be to be reexamined. The main one of these is that, along with many
other participants on all sides in the debates in which I had been
engaged, too little attention was given to the situation of individuals and
communities in the process of development, and too much to the
national economic aspects of the process.
IV
Chapters 6 and 7 return to some of the arguments of the earlier Chapters
but with a different focus. They are primarily attempts made in the mid-
to late-1980s to describe and assess empirical developments in
developing countries in the preceding two decades. I maintain in Chapter
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7 that events relating to development after the late-1970s, the heyday of
the debate between dependency and its critics, have been inherently
surprising to both sides. Predictions of the future of development made
20 years ago from different vantage points in the development debate
turned out to be very far from what actually happened. Both sides in an
over-polarized debate had written too much as if they expected
experiences in different parts of the world to to be relatively
homogeneous and relatively long lasting. Yet, if we want to find a
characteristic of the 'third world' as a single entity in the last 20 years, it
would surely have to to be its heterogeneity and polarization-another
way, perhaps, of saying that the third world is not a single entity.
Countries do not range themselves around an average which even
approximately corresponds to what either side was expecting. These
surprises were partly the outcome of the dramatic and general
unpredicted events of the early 1970s which gave rise to a major crisis of
the world economy and which had a profound influence on the
polarization of economic experience in the poorer countries.
Three of the important events which define this unexpected and
polarized outcome are the development successes of East Asia, the debt
crisis and its aftermath in Latin America and the alarming economic
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Korea's development does not fit neatly into any of the paradigms
discussed in the development debates of the 1960s an 1970s and its
causes are still a very open question.
Chapter 7 insists on the significance of this development and on the fact
that it cannot to be relegated to the status of an exception. I have not
made any detailed study of the Korean case but it does seem to me that it
confirms in part the usefulness of the list of conditions for successful
independent industrialization outlined in Chapter 3 (3.4-3.7). These have
been much criticized as being too demanding", but they are in fact
remarkably close to the account now most frequently given of the
reasons for Korea's success' (a home market, a balanced industrial
structure, a relatively equal income distribution, a strong accumulating
class assisted by the state, home grown technological development and
little foreign capital).
The recent experience of Latin America has been equally unexpected but
in a different way; the surprise dates more or less from the debt crisis
which began in 1982 and whose effects have been profound in almost
countries of the continent. There followed the infamous 'lost decade' in
which very many social and economic indicators in most Latin
American countries worsened. In one sense this conforms to what
dependency theory would have predicted, the transfer of value from
Latin America to the rich, creditor countries. Chapter 7, however,
stresses that this exceptionally large transfer of resources which lasted
from 1983 to 1990 (see Figure 1), was due to very different structures
4 For instance by Bill Warren, 'Imperialism and capitalist industrialization', New Left Review,
81, September/October 1973 and Anthony Brewer, Marxist theories oj imperialism, pp. 273-6
S For instance, by Alice Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and late industrialization,
New York: Oxford University Press, 1989
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than those which structuralist and dependency theorists had emphasized.
The big transformation, of course, is that the basis of claims on the
production of Latin American countries shifted from trade and
investment (the activities of the multinationals in the language of
dependency theorists) to finance (the banks, the IMF and the creditor
governments) whose previous role had been very marginal.
Figure 1: Transfers associated with the debt, 1983-1993
100 ---,---------_,--------
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- Latin America
- Developing
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Sub...aharan Africa
N<JI1h Africa
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Source: World Bank, World Debt Tables, 1994-95
It is the economic indicators for Africa which in the last 20 years show
the worst record. For the continent as a whole national income per head
has changed little over that period and many other indicators show
worsening trends. The data up to the mid-1980s is summarized in
Chapter 6. It has not improved overall in the decade since then.
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Chapter 7 attempts to give an overall picture of these very divergent
experiences in the international economic experiences of third world
countries, under the headings of trade, direct investment, debt, aid and
migration. While its form of analysis still contains echoes of the
dependency school it insists on a number of differences. It emphasizes
the enormous polarization in economic experience, in no way regarding
the successes as some sort of exception to a rule. And it shows how debt
became much more important than foreign investment in determining
international flows of resources.
The danger with the methods used in these articles is that their
conclusions rely on national economic statistics which may to be
unreliable and misleading because they average very diverse experiences
within a nation. They may lead to the 'exaggerate pessimism' of which
John Sender and Sheila Smith have rightly complained", This is truer of
Chapter 6 than of Chapter 7. This may have something to do with the
fact that between writing these two pieces I spent a year teaching in
Nicaragua. That experience brought home to me how little of a story can
to be revealed by macroeconomic figures. No macroeconomic figures
could to be worse than those for Nicaragua during the 1980s: a constant
3 percent annual reduction in the GDP, galloping inflation, the reduction
of the real wage in the formal sector by over 98%. Yet even in 1987,
while everyone was short of everything one did not see people in the
state of total poverty which is such a common sight in New York,
London or Madrid. The resilience of societies to economic crisis and
decline is composed of many factors. In Nicaragua those which were
crucial were the relative equality of income distribution, the relative
6 John Sender and Sheila Smith, 'What's right with the Berg Report and what's left of its
criticisms'. in Peter Lawrence (ed), World Recession and the Food Crisis in Africa. London:
James Currey, 1986
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strength of personal, group and political social support mechanisms and
perhaps more than anything else the remittances of money by emigrants.
In Africa it appears that the main difference between countries which
have suffered major worsening in human and social indicators and those
which have not is not the difference in the rate of growth or decline of
the GDP but the presence or absence of wars.
v
One of the themes of Chapter 7 is the rapidly changing structure of
world trade, with a fast growing manufactures component and a stagnant
or declining primary products component. A significant part of the
polarization between countries has been associated with this. The trends
continue and can to be brought up to date with the aid of a few graphs.
Figures 2 - 5 show a pronounced industrialization of commodity trade
both for the world (2) and for very many countries (3), but scarcely at all
for Africa, a polarization of shares of world trade between different
groups of countries (4) and the extreme concentration of the new
manufactured exports in a few countries (5).
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Figure 2: The commodity and country composition of exports,
1970 and 1992
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Source of data: World Bank, World Development Report 1994
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Figure 3: The commodity composition of trade, 1970 and 1992
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Figure 5: The concentration of developing country manufactured
exports, 1992
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The foregoing graphs show at a glance how countries which have caught
the upward current of world markets for manufactures have prospered
while those which have not have in many cases suffered immiserizing
consequences and these countries, as the maps make clear, are largely in
Africa. Maizels' recently updated conclusions about the vast terms of
trade losses of African exporters during the 1980s and 1990s give an
idea of the burden of this trade pattern 7• In this sense an aspect of the
involvement with the world market is a cause of immizeration, as the old
dependency theory predicted. But, these facts do not support the often
implied conclusion that progress would to be faster given more isolation
from the world market. Chapter 7, using a nowadays not very
fashionable vocabulary, finds it necessary to add the question of
marginalization to exploitation and domination as problems of the
position of African countries in the world economy. Paraphrasing Marx
on the subject of workers, it is argued that for underdeveloped countries
there is one thing worse than being drawn into the capitalist world
market through trade and investment, that is NOT being drawn into the
capitalist world market. It is striking that the impoverishment of African
countries in recent years has coincided with their growing
marginalization from the world economy. Africa's share of world trade
and investment has sharply declined. Its dependence on aid, especially
short term, emergency aid, has risen.
7 Alfred Maizels, Commodities in Crisis, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993 and Alfred Maizels,
'The continuing commodity crisis of developing countries', World Development, vol 22, No.ll,
1994
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VI
All debates about meanings in social science must have a subplot to do
with measurement. A major part of Chapter 2 was concerned with
finding some satisfactory empirical measure of the concept of
industrialization. The three gateway definition of industrialization which
is developed there was designed to get away from oversimplified
empirical statements. It was in a tradition of interest in the structure of
economies between major sectors (both in product and output) which
has, in the development field at least, been largely superseded. The
measure is related to the definitions of independent industrialization,
already discussed, has been found useful by some later writers and in
particular was developed graphically in a most ingenious way by the
authors of the Open University Atlas of Economic Development.
It is not possible here to repeat the update of the statistics which I
attempted in Chapter 5 (5.5-5.9). A cursory look at the figures, however,
shows that the same trends continue. A growing number of countries
pass the first two gateways. But still very few pass the third gateway,
thus supporting the notion that modern economic growth in many
developing countries fails to spread its effects into large parts of the
population. But according to the highest of the available estimates,
China would now pass all three tests. The other conclusion of the update
in Chapter 5 may now have to to be modified. There I suggest that in
contemporary industrializations, structural change was running
'precociously' ahead of productivity development. The productivity
measures, however, were based on estimates of value added converted to
dollars at exchange rates. One of the most important developments in
development-related data in the last 3 or 4 years is the rapidly growing
xBen Crow and others, Third World Atlas, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1983
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availability of macroeconomic indicators calculated at purchasing
power parity, the result of the International Comparisons Project. Since
those figures tend to raise the value of production and income in the
poorer countries they tend to reduce the previously observed difference
between levels of industrial productivity between rich and poor
countries. In 1978 the calculated ratio between UK and Korean
industrial productivity was 4.3:1 (see 5.7). A combination of Korea's
growth, the UK's stagnation and the use of ppp estimates had reduced
that ratio by 1991 to 1.6:19• On present trends Korea's industrial output
per head will surpass that of the UK well before the end of the century.
A small diversion on the significance of the ppp figures is in order since
their use is also an important part of the development of the Human
Development Index (commented on in Chapter 9) and since I have been
making a separate study of these figures with a view to deciding what is
gained and lost by using them as opposed to the still more easily
available exchange rate converted figures.
Their development emerges from a critique of the concept of GOP/GNP.
The number of different critiques of this concept from the point of view
of development is long:
- it is a national average and makes no allowances for distribution
- it undervalues non-marketed goods and services; this, among
other things devalues the contribution made by women to welfare
- it values all goods and services included equally, regardless of
their moral or qualitative nature
- it fails to account for contamination and the depletion of natural
wealth and even double values pollution when resources are
9 Calculated from data in World Resources Institute, World Resources 1994-5, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1994, Ta hies 15.1 and 16.1
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devoted to clearing it up (see 10.10-10.11)
- it converts national values to a common currency by means of
the exchange rate but there may to be artificial unrealistic official
exchange rates or multiple rates
- in converts at national exchange rates which may change and
which may fail to reflect real price differences
The creating of ppp estimates of national income and product is a
response only to the last of those criticisms, so it would to be wrong to
see it as rehabilitating the concept in general as a measure of
development or welfare. Nonetheless, it does represent in principle an
improvement. In practice, it is more difficult to decide. In the first place
there are several estimates available of ppp national income figures and,
even when they come from the same source, they give very different
results 10. The reason for such discrepancies may to be that insufficient
resources are devoted to the investigation of price levels, especially in
poor countries. It is probable that the estimates for many countries are
made using very little direct information and a lot of inference and short-
cuts (for instance assuming that there are systematic similarities in price
deviations between particular groups of countries).
to For instance those in the World Bank's World Development Report 1994 and in its Atlas
1995.
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Figure 6: How ppp changes the range of income per head
Figure 7: PPP income as a multiple of exchange rate income
Sources: World Bank, Atlas 1995
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It is not as if statistical inconsistency is unique to ppp figures. And there
is some particular appeal to using one source of such figures because
they have been processed under the direction of a single experienced
economist and, although characterized by extremely daring assumptions,
have been produced with a consistent approach. I refer to the data set
produced by Angus Maddison" which allows comparison between the
main macroeconomic series of 36 countries (containing 70 percent of the
world's population) over a period of nearly 100 years.
I mention these figures because, assuming they are the best available set
of comparative macroeconomic data for the 20th century, then they
should in principle have something to say to the issues which are
debated in these chapters. Figure 8 shows these Maddison's estimates of
GDP per head as a proportion of the USA level since 1900. It tells some
very clear stories: the rise and partial decline of US dominance over the
century; the sharp rise and simultaneous convergence of the OEeD
countries in the second half of the century; the convergence and
downward relative movement of Latin America; and the relative decline
followed by divergence of developing countries in Asia. More
controversially, I would say that the figures give some support to
dependency and related hypotheses about the world economy, namely
that it is dominated by forces which maintain or even widen the gap
between the developed and the underdeveloped. Some countries are
crossing that gap, but up to now very few and none from Latin America
or from Africa (Maddison does not include any African country, but ppp
figures recently available from 1950 to the present'? would show most
African countries to to be level or declining on this graph.
II Angus Maddison, The World Economy in the Twentieth Century, Paris: OECD, 1989
12 University of Pennsylvania International Comparisons Center, Penn World Tables version
5.6, Cambridge, Mass: NBER, computer disk, 1995
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Figure 8: GDP per head in international (ppp) $, 1900-1987,
36 countries
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VII
Part of Chapter 5 and almost all of Chapters 9 and 10 are concerned with
currents of opinion which question the value of development as it is
occurring or even the utility and the possibility of the universal
development objective itself. These currents are, of course, very diverse
but they tend to lead to conclusions with a considerable overlap.
Chapter 9 and 10 are mostly concerned to find and relate what is positive
in the new skeptical, alternative modes of thinking about development,
especially from the human development and environmentalist camps. I
was, not surprisingly, both excited and intrigued by the arrival of the
UNDO's Human Development Report and the Human Development
Index included in it. This was an officially sanctioned re-examination of
the nature and measurement of development and was the outcome of one
of the important alternative currents of thought which had been
questioning earlier notions of development. For the most part this
current was composed of critical social scientists, especially economists,
who had not been part of the dependency or marxist critiques of
development thinking. Human Development is important because it
addresses the utopian concerns about "actually existing development" of
many observers (see Chapters 4, 5 and 10), and because it is based on a
carefully thought out attempt to reformulate the notion of development,
reducing its identification with countries as opposed to the needs of
individuals. reducing its identification with particular average income
levels and national production structures.
Chapter 9 warmly appreciates the contribution made by the
Human Development Index and makes a number of criticisms. Some of
these are methodological: for instance the fact that the Human
Development Index measured only relative development at an instant
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and so cannot to be compared over time. That particular fault has now
been rectified but, as my colleagues at the University of the Basque
Country show, at the cost of introducing incoherence into the real
weightings of the variables making up the index". Many of the
criticisms are openly recognized by the HDI's authors and result from
the embryonic character which the index retains. And not a few of the
criticisms seem to to be the result of the political constraints
(presumably United States government pressure) under which the index
and report are produced (the evident manipulation of figures to influence
the order of countries, the dropping of human rights from the report, and
so on).
I regret to note that there are signs that the important new development
debate opened up by the appearance of the Human Development Report,
far from being too polarized, may not to be polarized enough. As the
World Bank pays growing lip service to the importance of eliminating
poverty, so the Human Development Report makes increasingly
diplomatic reference to the need to accept structural adjustment and
market-friendly policies. Behind this apparent convergence there is,
however, a real divergence of approaches which is fundamental to the
future of development thinking. It is between seeing development in the
first place as the rapid growth of national economic aggregates and
seeing it in the first place as an improvement in the real quality of life of
those most in need. Those two objectives can sometimes to be realized
together but there are many conditions under which they are not. The
pressures which affect international organizations suggest that the
further development of this promising new line of development thinking
will have to to be done outside the official international organizations.
13 Casilda Lasso de la Vega and Ana Marta Urrutia. 'A proposal on weighting the indicators in
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A final criticism made of the Human Development Report in Chapter 9
is that it so far dedicated very little attention to one of the other streams
of alternative thinking about development of recent years: that of the
environmentalist movement. Chapter 10 (which is in part derived from
Chapter 8) is, therefore, an attempt to tell the story of development
thinking over the last 40 years and to integrate two of the critiques which
seem to me to to be necessary and original into a meaningful concept of
"sustainable human development". This is a concept which has been
used, but not much analyzed, by the UNDP and others. The simple
model put forward in the last part of Chapter 10 helps, I believe, to see
theoretically how questions such as economic growth, technical progress
and redistribution relate to the question of realizing human and
sustainable development simultaneously.
I already feel the need to add some cautions to Chapter 10, especially in
view of the rapidity with which alternative critiques of development are
appearing. In all fields today it is common to see the notion of progress
as an ambiguous and difficult one, and even to reject it altogether as an
illusion. This aspect of post-modernist thinking is spreading fast in the
discussion of development. A glance of the list of new books gives the
strong impression that there is almost a school of thinking which it is
tempting to call 'post-developmentalism'. It is seductive, it is partly
correct, but in its most undiluted forms it can to be dangerous because it
promotes the false idea that the human race can somehow sustain itself
without the development of technology, industrial production, high
productivity and so on, sometimes throwing in the half-truth that it did
so in the past much better than it does today. That point does not come
out as clearly as I think it could in Chapters 8 and 10. If there were a
Chapter 11 it would to be about the dangers of this 'post-
developmentalism'. Increasingly that set of tendencies is saying not only
that everything that happens is for the worse but also that not even
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anything remotely resembling development in the old shared sense
could playa even partially positive role. As so often, a good case is in
danger of being destroyed by overstatement.
